"No de dónde viene esta información, que quiere decir, sino, de lo que esta nueva información ha transformado en el territorio mental de este colectivo y de sus dispositivos de autoridad". Regis Debray
jueves, 28 de noviembre de 2013
jueves, 7 de noviembre de 2013
(De www.propublica.org)
November 6, 2014: This story has been
updated to reflect new developments.
Nearly six months ago,
President Obama promised more transparency and tighter policies around targeted
killings. In a speech, Obama vowed that the U.S.
would only use force against a “continuing and imminent threat to the American
people.” It would fire only when there was “near-certainty” civilians would not
be killed or injured, and when capture was not feasible. The number of drone strikes
has dropped this year, but
they’ve continued to make headlines. On Friday, a U.S. drone killed the head of the Pakistani
Taliban. A few days
earlier came the first drone strike in Somalia in nearly two years. How much has changed
since the president’s speech?
We don’t know the U.S.
count of civilian deaths
The administration says that it has a count of civilian deaths, and that there is a “wide gap” between U.S. and
independent figures. But the administration won’t release its own figures.
Outside estimates of total civilian deaths since 2002 range from just over 200 to more than 1,000.
The Pakistani government has given three different numbers: 400, 147, and 67.
McClatchy and the Washington Post obtained intelligence
documents showing that for long stretches of time, the CIA estimated few or no
civilian deaths. The documents also confirmed the use of signature strikes, in which the U.S. targets
people without knowing their identity. The CIA categorized many of those killed
as simply “other militants” or “foreign fighters.” The Post wrote that the
agency sometimes designated “militants” with what seemed like circumstantial or
vague evidence, such as “men who were ‘probably’ involved in cross-border
attacks” in Afghanistan.
The administration
reportedly curtailed signature strikes
this year, though the new guidelines don’t necessarily preclude them. A White
House factsheet released around Obama’s speech said that “it is not the case
that all military-aged males in the vicinity of a target are deemed to be
combatants.” It did not say that people must be identified. (In any case, the
U.S. has not officially acknowledged the policy of signature strikes.)
Attorney General Eric Holder confirmed only that four
Americans have been killed by drone strikes since 2009: Anwar al Awlaki and his
sixteen-year-old son, Abdulrahman,Samir Khan, and Jude Kenan Mohammed. Holder said that only the
elder Awlaki was “specifically targeted,” but did not explain how the others
came to be killed. Although Obama said that
this disclosure was intended to “facilitate transparency and debate,” since then, the
administration has not commented on specific allegations of civilian
deaths.
We don’t know exactly who
can be targeted
The list of groups that the
military considers “associated forces” of Al Qaeda is classified. The administration has declared that it targets
members of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and “elements” of Al Shabaab, but there are still questions
about how the U.S. determines that an individual belonging to those groups is
in fact a “continuing and imminent threat.” (After the terror alarm that led to
the closing of U.S. embassies this summer, officials told the New York Times they had “expanded
the scope of people [they] could go after” in Yemen.)
This ties into the debate
over civilian casualties: The government would seem to consider some people
legitimate targets that others don’t.
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch conducted in-depth
studies of particular strikes in Pakistan and Yemen, respectively. They include eyewitness reports of civilian deaths.
(Most of the deaths investigated happened before the Obama administration’s new
policies were announced, although the administration has not said when those
guidelines went into effect.) The reports also raised questions of the legality of specificstrikes, questioning whether the
deaths were all unavoidable casualties of legitimate attacks. It does not appear that the U.S. plans
to expand strikes against Al Qaeda to other countries – officials have
reportedly told Iraq, for example, it won’t send drones there. But the U.S. has
established a surveillance drone base in Niger, and fed information from
drones to French forces fighting in Mali.
We don’t know if the U.S.
compensates civilian casualties
CIA director John Brennan
suggested during his confirmation hearing that the U.S. madecondolence payments to harmed families.
But there is little evidence of it happening. U.S. Central Command told ProPublica that it had 33 pages related to condolence
payments – but wouldn’t release any of them to us.
We don’t always know which
strikes are American
While unnamed officials sometimes
confirm that strikes came from U.S. drones, other attacks may be from Pakistani, Yemeni, or even Saudi planes. (It’s also worth noting
that the U.S. has also used cruise missiles and Special Forces raids. But the bulk of U.S.
counterterrorism actions outside Afghanistan in recent years appear to rely on
drones.)
We don’t know the precise
legal rationale behind the strikes
Some members of Congress
have seen the legal memos behind targeted killing of U.S. citizens. But
lawmakers were not granted access to all memos on the
program. Legislationpending in the Senate would require the
administration to give the Intelligence Committees a list of such legal
opinions. Other congressmen have
introduced bills with more reporting
requirements for targeted killings. (Proposals for a “drone court” for oversight have not
gotten very far.) It’s far from clear that any of that additional oversight
would lead to public disclosure.
The government and the
American Civil Liberties Union and the New York Times arestill locked in court battles over requests for
drone documents. While a judge has ruled the CIA can no longer assert the “fiction” that it can’t reveal if it has any interest in drones, the agency hasn’t been compelled to release any information
yet. The government has also so far fought off disclosure of legal memos
underpinning targeted killings.
And here are some things
we’ve learned through leaks and independent reporting:
How the U.S. tracks
targets: Documents
provided by Edward Snowden to the Washington Post detailed the NSA’s “extensive
involvement.” Lawyers in a terrorism-related case also uncovered reports that government
surveillance of their client may have led to a drone strike in Somalia. The Atlantic published a detailed account of
Yemen using a child to plant a tracking chip on a man who was killed in a U.S.
strike.
What people in the
countries affected think:
The Pakistani government’s cooperation with at least some
U.S. drone strikes – long an open secret
– has now been well-documented. Public sentiment in the
country is vividly anti-drone, even when violent Taliban commanders
are killed, and politicians continue to denounce them as American interference. Limited polling in the
region most affected by drones is contradictory, with some saying that at the
very least, they prefer drones to the Pakistani military campaigns. Life in
those areas is between a drone and a hard place: Residents told Amnesty
International of the psychological toll from drones, and they also facereprisals from militants
who accuse them of spying.
Yemen’s president continues
to openly embrace U.S. strikes, though the public generally
opposes them – particularly those strikes that hit lower-level fighters, or those whose
affiliations with Al Qaeda aren’t clear. Foreign Policy recently detailed the aftermath of an
August strike where two teenagers died. Their family disputes they had any link
to terrorism.
The physical
infrastructure: More of the network of drone bases across the world has
been revealed – from the unmasking of a secret base in Saudi Arabia to the fact that
drones had to be moved off the U.S. base in Djibouti, in the Horn of Africa,
after crashes and fear of collision with passenger planes.
The CIA’s role: The administration had
reportedly planned to scale back the CIA’s role in targeted killing, moving
control of much of the drone program to the military. But the CIA reportedly
still handles strikes in Pakistan and has a role in Yemen as well. Officials told Foreign
Policy yesterday that the transition won't happen anytime soon.
The history of the
programs: Revelations continue to change our understanding of the contours of the
drone war, but two books published this year offer comprehensive accounts – The Way of the Knife, by Mark Mazzetti of the
New York Times, and Dirty Wars, by Jeremy Scahill.
Cyberespionaje, sociedad de control, tecnociencia y la ley
sobreexplotación e indignados
el mundo globalizado es aquí y ahora
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